# 1AR---UK RR---Race 2

## Manufacturing

#### Their studies are theoretically and empirically disproven.

Thomas Sablowski 23. Senior fellow for the political economy of globalization at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Ph.D. in political science. "The Inflation Enigma." Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 2/9/2023. rosalux.de/en/news?tx\_news\_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bnews%5D=49901&tx\_news\_pi1%5Bnews\_uid%5D=0&cHash=c6c71e79dca3a83686dd9a3c73ce2686

Do Excessive Wage Rises Cause Inflation?

Another common theory about inflation؅ concerns what is known as the “wage-price spiral”. This theory, advocated by neoclassical economists and Keynesians alike, claims that inflation is caused by an excessive increase in wages: higher wages result in higher production costs, leading to higher prices. In terms of economic policy, it is argued that wage increases must be curbed should they exceed increases in labour productivity. The wage-price spiral premise quite obviously aligns with the interests of capital.

From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear whether, in a competitive economy, companies are even able to transfer rising labour costs onto product prices, or whether falling profit rates are far more the consequence of rising wages. Also unclear is the extent to which companies combat wage increases by using machines to replace the workforce, thereby cutting their wage expenses. Investments in optimization and rationalization could cause increased unemployment, weaken trade unions, and thus curb wage increases. It remains an open question whether the wage-price spiral even exists. In any case, the theory stipulates that only wage increases that exceed productivity growth lead to rising inflation rates. Whether they are more likely to cause profit rates to sink or inflation to rise is likely to depend on the conditions of competition.

While the gas crisis likely influenced inflation in the EU, it is more difficult to trace how the rise in energy prices has affected inflation in the US.

Moreover, here, too, the question of causality is relevant: high nominal wage increases could be a consequence of high inflation rates, rather than their cause. In any case, companies experience higher costs not only due to wage increases, but also from increasing costs for the means of production. This perspective is far more relevant to our current conjecture, especially taking into account the rising prices of energy derived from fossil fuel.

If we take a look at the actual development of wages in Germany,[1] for example we see the nominal wage bill increased by an average of 4.25 percent per year between 2013 and 2019. The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), the most common measure of the inflation rate in the European Union, rose by an average of only 1.15 percent per year during the same period. Real wages, i.e. the difference between nominal wages and the inflation rate, thus increased by more than 3 percent annually. Inflation remained low despite the significant increase in nominal wages.

During the 2020 pandemic, the nominal wage bill decreased by 0.24 percent. The consumer price index (CPI) for Germany increased by 0.4 percent. Employees thus suffered a 0.64-percent decrease in their real wages. In 2021, the nominal wage total increased by 3.5 percent compared with the shrunken baseline of the previous year. Thus, one can say that the increase in nominal wages still lagged behind the wage increases from 2013–2019. However, this was concurrently offset by a 3.2 percent increase in the CPI. In sum, wage earners only saw their purchasing power rise by 0.3 percent.

In 2022, nominal wages grew by 5.5 percent, but the CPI rose by 8.7 percent. This meant that employees suffered an average real wage loss of 3.2 percent. This demonstrates that there is no clear causal link between wage increases and inflation — the wage-price spiral does not exist. Rather, it seems that during certain phases of capitalist development, real wage increases are possible while inflation remains low. In the current phase of accelerated inflation, on the other hand, nominal wage increases have been unable to compensate for the rise in prices, and wage earners have ended up losing considerable purchasing power as a result. Thus, from the perspective of wage earners, what is needed is not lower but higher wage increases to correct the redistribution in favour of capital brought about by recent price increases.

There is another explanation for inflation which still maintains that wages are major drivers of inflation. Rather than pointing to cost pressures on the supply side, this theory emphasizes the pull of demand provoked by rising wages. In other words, an increase in wages would lead to an increase in demand for goods and services, driving up prices. This, however, ignores the fact that rising profits also create demand. If the share of wages in the value product rises, then the share of profits falls, and vice-versa — if the share of profits rises, then the share of wages falls. Prices can only be driven upwards if the combined purchasing power of wages and profits rises — and if production cannot keep up with this rise in purchasing power. The latter seems to be the crux of the matter in explaining the recent wave of inflation.

### Manufacturing---Impact---Innovation---1AR

### Manufacturing---Impact---Readiness---1AR

## Monopsony

#### Gramm is wrong:

#### 1. SKEWED DATA.

Noah ’22 [Timothy; September 21; Staff Writer, B.A. in English from Harvard University; The New Republic, “Phil Gramm Thinks Poor People Have It Too Easy,” https://newrepublic.com/article/167811/texas-senator-phil-gramm-inequality-myth]

Gramm’s latest exercise in error is The Myth of American Inequality. Gramm and his co-authors, Robert Ekelund and John Early, maintain that America is becoming not more economically unequal but less so. This is a very daring argument, given the mountain of evidence to the contrary. Other conservatives have argued that growing economic inequality doesn’t matter, but not many have argued that economic inequality doesn’t exist. How do you even make such an argument? Here’s how, in four easy steps.

Scramble the timeline. “Income inequality is not rising,” Gramm and his co-authors state. “It has in fact fallen by 3.0 percent since 1947 as compared to the 22.9 percent increase shown in the Census measure.” This is sheer lunacy.

As Gramm well knows, incomes became more equal from the 1930s through the late 1970s. Around 1979, that trend reversed itself and incomes started becoming less equal. They have become steadily less equal ever since, and today, according to Berkeley economist Emmanuel Saez, the top 10 percent’s share of national income exceeds the previous high in 1929 (scroll down to Figure One).

If you start your timeline in 1947, as Gramm and Co. do, you capture a huge chunk of the pre-1979 decline. If you see someone mapping the inequality trend who doesn’t begin around 1979, that’s an immediate tipoff that they’re pulling a fast one.

For the record, though, income inequality by any honest measure has increased almost as much since 1947 as it has since 1979.

Emphasize broad-based inequality. As I explained in my 2012 book, The Great Divergence, there is not one income-inequality trend but two coinciding trends. The starker trend, mapped by Saez and Thomas Piketty, shows huge gains in the pre-tax share of national income by the top 10 percent, the top 1 percent, and the top 0.1 percent, with the gains getting larger the higher you go. (You can make these gains slightly smaller by factoring in taxes and government transfers, but only slightly.) The second, less stark trend is the broad-based post-1979 growth in income inequality as measured by the Gini index and/or by dividing the population into five “quintiles”: the bottom 20 percent, second 20 percent, middle 20 percent, and so on. The gap here, which has mostly stabilized over the past couple of decades, is between college graduates and non–college graduates. Among the reasons you haven’t lately seen the broad-based trend worsening is a weakening in the economic strength of the professional-managerial class (nicely described in 2013 by the late Barbara Ehrenreich and her former husband, the psychologist and author John Ehrenreich).

#### 2. BENEFITS MISCALCULATION.

Noah ’22 [Timothy; September 21; Staff Writer, B.A. in English from Harvard University; The New Republic, “Phil Gramm Thinks Poor People Have It Too Easy,” https://newrepublic.com/article/167811/texas-senator-phil-gramm-inequality-myth]

Gramm takes census data on pretax income and adds in the value of taxes, employee benefits, and government assistance. Fair enough. But if you want to argue that income inequality is a fantasy, that adjustment won’t get you there; you’ll just get a slightly less pronounced inequality trend. If you want to say black is white and up is down, you have to factor in the value of the benefit that OECD excludes: health insurance, funded privately or publicly.

Here’s how Berkeley economist Gabriel Zucman, who hasn’t read Gramm’s book but did read an August Wall Street Journal op-ed summarizing its main points, explained the health insurance problem in an email:

The claim on the high growth of bottom incomes is largely due to the inclusion of Medicaid and other in-kind health transfers at cost. Because health care is so incredibly expensive in the US this looks like a huge transfer to the bottom but of course that’s not income flowing to Medicaid beneficiaries, but to the providers of health care services, many of whom are towards the top of the distribution.

### Monopsony---Impact---Slow Growth---1AR

### Monopsony---Impact---Disease---1AR

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#### UBI fuels poverty and inequality

Rachel Minogue 18, Economic Fellow. International Trade Specialist, Professional Services, International Trade Administration. BA, International Studies, Emory University MA, International Economics, Johns Hopkins University, "Five Problems with Universal Basic Income," Third Way, May 24th, 2018, <https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income>

Many of the most ardent UBI supporters believe the policy is an answer to a world where work is vanishing. This is a popular view in Silicon Valley, where many predict widespread technological unemployment is just around the corner.4 But there is almost no evidence that work is ending. Instead, work is changing.

* The US economy employs more people today than ever, with 37 million jobs added since the introduction of Microsoft Windows in 1993 and 190,000 new jobs created per month over the last year on average.5
* As Baby Boomers retire, the US working-age population will grow more slowly than the economy as a whole. For that reason, the US is just as likely to experience a shortage of labor to fill growing jobs as it is to have a labor market oversaturated with workers.6
* Many professions are rising in demand today, including those in health care, advanced manufacturing, skilled construction, education, technology, hospitality, and business management.
* At this very moment, there are 6 million job openings across the country, more than half of which are middle-class jobs or better.7

While we may see a net gain in jobs over the coming years, disruption will still be rampant. These jobs will be in different locations, require different skills, and offer different benefits. That’s why we need policies that help workers adjust to these new realities—not surrender. Reinventing postsecondary education to create more options outside of a four-year college degree, as well as redesigning worker pay and benefits, would do far more for the next generation of workers.

Economic growth would suffer

With a foundational, albeit limited, income under UBI, some Americans may choose to work part-time instead of full-time. Others may leave the labor force for years when they would have otherwise worked. Eduardo Porter writes that, as almost one quarter of US households make less than $25,000 a year, a $10,000 check each for two parents could change their decisions on how to balance work, child care, and other obligations, resulting in less full-time participation in the labor force.8

If people transition away from full-time work, the US economy would suffer. Macroeconomic theory holds that economic growth is dependent on three factors: increases in capital, advances in technology, and growth of the labor force. UBI has the potential to directly decrease the growth of the US economy, namely GDP growth, through reductions to labor force participation. With GDP shrinking, tax revenues would fall. This would in turn mean fewer resources to help the disadvantaged or to invest in the future, resulting in lower overall prosperity.

UBI is incredibly expensive

The numbers speak for themselves: UBI is either very expensive or very stingy. The progressive version of UBI is expensive to the point of impossibility, while the conservative version is penny-pinching and punitive. Looking first at the former, consider an annual grant of $12,000 for all American adults aged 18 to 64, like Stern proposes. Stern estimates his plan would cost between $1.75 trillion and $2.5 trillion. The high end of this range seems realistic. Almost two-thirds of the population, or 200 million people, would receive a monthly UBI check for $1,000, with a cost of approximately $2.4 trillion every year, or one-eighth of GDP.9 Social Security beneficiaries currently receiving less than $1,000 a month would also get a supplement, adding an estimated $52 billion a year.10 By comparison, our entire existing social safety net costs $2.6 trillion. That includes Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Unemployment Insurance, and veterans’ benefits.11

A graph of a number of columns

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

Unless these critically important programs are eliminated, a UBI program would need to be paid for with higher taxes. It’s not clear whether it’s even possible to raise enough revenue for this initiative. The federal government took in approximately $3.3 trillion in 2017, so a taxes-only approach to funding Stern’s UBI would require an unheard-of 73% increase in federal revenue.12 Even if defense spending was slashed by one-third, for example, a 52% tax increase would still be required.13 Funneling all of a tax increase into UBI would also neglect our existing programs, like Social Security, which needs financial support to remain solvent past 2034.14

Poor families could be left more vulnerable

If significant tax hikes aren’t viable, then the question remains: what gets cut in order to fund UBI? Under this scenario, UBI becomes stingy and punitive, as a vast amount of important government programs would be on the chopping block.

Murray, the conservative UBI proponent, recommends that a $13,000 annual basic income replace all social assistance programs. Consider the value of the benefits people would lose: Medicaid, Medicare, Disability Insurance, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, SNAP, Section 8 housing vouchers, Pell Grants, the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. As Dylan Matthews writes, “$13,000 a year doesn’t mean much if you lose insurance that was paying $60,000 a year on chemotherapy.”15

Even a UBI that retains much of the existing social safety net could hit the disadvantaged harder, depending on which tax credits and government assistance programs get cut. Stern listed the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and housing assistance as potential policies to end in favor of UBI. But consider one example. In Queens, New York, a single, low-income working parent with three children can receive up to $31,100 worth of benefits annually from SNAP, the EITC, and Section 8 housing vouchers alone, and for good reason.16 Replacing those benefits with a $12,000 UBI for the parent would reduce the family’s income and benefits by $19,100.

A fundamental motivation for UBI is to eliminate poverty, but the tradeoffs necessary for funding would likely cause harm to vulnerable populations. This begs the question: If the main difference between UBI and our current safety net is that UBI gives relatively more to people who don’t need help, what would make UBI worthwhile? Some proponents have suggested UBI could be restricted to certain populations in need, but that would defy the universality at the idea’s core. At this point, what they are really proposing is an expansion of the existing safety net. That’s a worthwhile conversation to have, but it’s not about a *universal* basic income.

The idea has been scarcely tested

There are a handful of past and ongoing experiments with UBI. Unfortunately, the experiments have been flawed or are too small to effectively prove that UBI could live up to some of its proponents’ claims:

* Finland’s national social insurance institute, Kela, launched a UBI trial experiment in 2017, with 2,000 Finns aged 25 to 58 receiving approximately $645 per month. A year into its implementation, the Finnish government refused to continue its funding in April 2018, choosing instead to pursue alternative social welfare projects.17
* The Alaska Permanent Fund provides an annual cash dividend to all Alaskan residents from oil reserve royalties. The grant’s amount, in recent years roughly $2,000 per person, is far too small to be a livable income and thus has minimal effects on the labor market and is a poor comparison to popular UBI proposals.18
* An experiment in Kenya launched by Give Directly in late 2017 compares different UBI methods across 120 villages. According to Business Insider, residents of 40 villages receive $270 annually for 12 years, “effectively doubling most people’s income,” while 80 villages receive the same amount for 2 years.19 While this experiment could produce more compelling evidence than prior trials, Kenya’s economy is at a very different stage of development compared to the US which limits the study’s relevance.
* Silicon Valley startup accelerator Y Combinator in 2017 began a five-year experiment in giving 1,000 people $1,000 per month and 2,000 people $50 a month, aiming to assess changes to the labor force and quality of life.20 This evaluation could yield important results given its similarities to leading proposals but is still early in the experiment.

It will be interesting to see what comes out of future studies and experiments. But policymakers should be wary of studies that simulate the upside of UBI (a monthly income) without simulating its downsides, namely sweeping benefit cuts or tax increases.

Conclusion

The motivation behind most universal basic income proposals is admirable: reduce widespread poverty and provide lifelong income security to all. But a UBI in reality would likely fall far short of eliminating poverty while imposing large economic costs and ignoring future opportunities for work. It also ignores that American life is rooted in a civic tradition of earning. Seventy-three percent of Americans believe working hard is “very important to getting ahead in life.”21 That’s the highest among advanced economies, with the United Kingdom second at 60% and Germany (49%), Japan (42%), South Korea (34%), and France (25%) far behind.22

## Midterms

### Midterms DA---Top---1AR

#### No polycrisis risk.

Daniel Drezner 23. professor of international politics at the Fletcher School and is the author of Drezner’s World, 1/28/2023, "Are we headed toward a “polycrisis”? The buzzword of the moment, explained." https://www.vox.com/23572710/polycrisis-davos-history-climate-russia-ukraine-inflation

The deeper flaw in the polycrisis logic is the presumption that one systemic crisis will inexorably lead to negative feedback effects that cause other systems to tip into crisis.

If this assumption does not hold, then the whole logic of a single polycrisis falls apart. To their credit, the Cascade Institute authors acknowledge that this might not happen, but they posit: “it seems more likely that causal interactions between systemic crises will worsen, rather than diminish, the overall emergent impacts.”

At first glance, this seems like a plausible assumption to make. Remember, however, that the proponents of a polycrisis also assert that the systems under stress are highly complex, leading to unpredictable cause-and-effect relationships. If that is true, then presuming that one systemic crisis would automatically exacerbate stresses in other systems seems premature at best and skewed at worst.

Indeed, over the last year there have been at least two examples of one systemic crisis actually lessening stress on another system.

China’s increasingly centralized autocracy generated a socioeconomic disaster in the form of “zero Covid” lockdowns. Xi Jinping kept that policy in place long after it made any sense, accidentally throttling China’s economy. The timing of China’s lockdown was fortuitous, however, as stagnant Chinese demand helped prevent an inflationary spiral from getting any worse. China’s exit from zero-Covid will likely also be countercyclical, jump-starting economic growth at a time when other regions tip into recession.

Another weird, fortuitous interaction has been the one between climate change and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As Europe aided Ukraine and resisted Russia’s blatant, illegal actions, Russia retaliated by cutting off energy exports. Many were concerned that Russia’s counter-sanctions would make this winter extremely hard and expensive for Europe.

Climate change may have provided a weird geopolitical assist to Europe, however. The warming climate is likely connected to Europe’s extremely temperate fall and winter. That, in turn, has required less electricity for heating, leaving the continent with plenty of energy reserves to last the winter. Russia’s ability to wreak havoc on the European economy has been circumscribed.

None of this is to say that systemic crises cannot exacerbate each other. Just because a polycrisis has not happened yet does not mean one is not on the horizon. Just as one buys insurance to guard against low-probability, high-impact outcomes, policymakers and elements of civil society need to guard against worst-case scenarios.

As a term of art, however, “polycrisis” distracts more than it adds. It mostly seems like a device to make people care about the Really Bad Things that climate change can do, without turning people off by warning them yet again about the hazards of climate change.

### Midterms---Dems Win Inev [Georgetown]---1AR

#### Republicans are too far gone because of Trump.

William A. Galston 25, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies at Brookings, “What History Tells Us About the 2026 Midterm Elections,” Brookings, 8/28/25, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-history-tells-us-about-the-2026-midterm-elections/

As we have seen, there is no modern precedent for the president’s party to avoid losses in the House unless the president’s job approval is well above 50%. By this measure, Trump has a long way to go.

#### Republicans won’t turn up if Trump’s name isn’t on the ballot.

William A. Galston 25, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies at Brookings, “What History Tells Us About the 2026 Midterm Elections,” Brookings, 8/28/25, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-history-tells-us-about-the-2026-midterm-elections/

If history is any guide, President Trump’s personal relationship with his supporters may work to the Democrats’ advantage, as it did in the 2018 midterm election after Trump’s upset victory over Hillary Clinton in 2016. In 2018, total support for House Republican candidates fell by more than 11.9 million votes (19%) from its 2016 level. Many Trump supporters didn’t turn out to vote when his name didn’t appear on the ballot. By contrast, total votes for House Democratic candidates in 2018 fell by only 845,000 (less than 2%) from their level two years earlier. The result: a 41-seat gain for House Democrats, enabling them to regain control of the House with a 36-seat majority.

#### Their ev spots us this.

Bronner and Mourtoupalas 25 – Principal Data Scientist at The Washington Post, M.S. in Statistics from Stanford University; Politics Journalist at The Washington Post.

Lenny Bronner and Nick Mourtoupalas, “What Democratic swings in special elections mean for 2026,” The Washington Post, 06-27-2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/06/27/democratic-special-election-gains/

It’s not too early to talk about 2026, when the first national elections will be held since Donald Trump was voted into the White House for a second time. It’s the first opportunity for Americans to register their approval or disapproval of Trump’s agenda by deciding whether to maintain a Republican congressional majority.

As such, politicos are scouring the landscape for any signs hinting at which way voters may be leaning in the 2026 midterms. If history is any guide, Democrats should gain seats in the House and Senate, because that has been the pattern of the party out of power in off-year contests, with a few notable exceptions.

### Midterms---Too Early [Georgetown]---1AR

#### Blue is the quotes I just read

Kilgore 25 – Political Analyst for New York Magazine and Intelligencer

Ed Kilgore, “Democrats Don’t Need Big Beautiful Calamity to Win the Midterms,” New York Magazine, July 14th, 2025, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/dems-dont-need-big-beautiful-calamity-to-win-the-midterms.html

There are three major data points that should be kept in mind in assessing the impact of the megabill. The first is that the parallel legislative package of the first Trump term, the Obamacare Repeal and Replace legislation, was never enacted, which means that Republicans entered the 2018 midterms with just the sweet dessert of tax cuts on their résumé rather than the foul-tasting budget cuts originally designed to pay for them. They still lost 41 House seats in the midterms. Signature bills aren’t always as significant as you might expect. The second data point is that prior to the enactment of the Big Beautiful Bill, Trump’s job approval rating was already chronically underwater, as was the GOP’s standing in the congressional generic ballot measuring party preferences for control of the House. Polls further showed very limited public consciousness of the details of the megabill as of the time Trump signed it.

#### Voters are clueless.

Ilya Somin 24, Professor of Law at George Mason University, B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies at the Cato Institute, “Both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris are Preying on Political Ignorance”, The Hill, 9/4/24, https://thehill.com/opinion/4860682-trump-harris-harmful-policies/

Extensive support for these terrible policies is part of a broader pattern of widespread political ignorance. Decades’ worth of data show that most voters know very little about government and public policy. For example, surveys show only about one-third to a half of Americans can even name the three branches of government.

Political ignorance is perfectly rational for most voters. If your only reason for following politics is to be a better voter, that turns out to not be much of an incentive at all, because there is so little chance that your vote will actually make a difference to the outcome of an election (about 1 in 60 million in a presidential race). Such “rational ignorance” incentivizes politicians to promote harmful-but-popular policies.

The danger of ignorance isn’t just that it leads voters to choose the “wrong” candidate. It’s that it incentivizes both parties to promote harmful policies that cater to ignorance. Not all bad policies are caused by ignorance, but voter ignorance does facilitate some terrible policies that a better-informed electorate would reject.

Many hope that ignorance can be alleviated through education. But political knowledge levels have remained flat for decades, despite massive increases in education spending and educational attainment.

A more promising approach is to reduce the impact of ignorance by limiting and decentralizing government, thereby empowering people to make more decisions by “voting with their feet.” People can vote with their feet in the private sector (by choosing which products to buy or which civil society organizations to join) or by choosing what state or local government to live under in a federal system. If federal power is reduced, more issues will be left up to states, localities, and the private sector, and people will have a wider range of foot voting options.

Most people spend more time and effort acquiring information deciding what television to buy than deciding whom to vote for in a presidential election. That isn’t because the presidency is less important than your television. It’s because when people choose a television, they know the decision will make a difference. Extensive empirical and experimental evidence shows that foot voters seek out more information and use it better than ballot box voters.

#### Policy is irrelevant.

Matt Robinson 24, Former Congressional Staffer, “What Political Ads and Spicy Meatballs Have in Common | Opinion”, Newsweek, 9/4/24, https://www.newsweek.com/what-political-ads-spicy-meatballs-have-common-opinion-1948221

Voters these days are not putting in the effort: they're radically tuned out, and certainly in no mood to engage their brains on details. Only one third of Americans even claim to follow any kind of news closely, and most go out of their way to avoid hearing political messages. And ads? People hate them. So, if you're the Harris campaign, you have to take the peripheral route to get where you're trying to go, not the central route which is jammed with mental traffic. And definitely don't take the Republican bait to sit for a lot of media interview deep dives.

#### Vibes reign supreme.

Jeff Bloodworth 24, Writer and Professor of American political history at Gannon University, “Pennsylvania is slipping out of Trump’s reach Vibes, not Policy, will Decide the Race”, UnHerd, 9/6/24, https://unherd.com/2024/09/pennsylvania-is-slipping-out-of-trumps-reach/

And that’s important — because while policy obviously matters, “vibes” reign supreme. Years ago, Peter Hart, the veritable Yoda of Democratic pollsters, explained why George W. Bush defeated Democrats whom voters deemed more intelligent and knowledgeable: “voters value ‘I Like’ over IQ”. If vibes didn’t precede ideology, Hillary Clinton would be finishing her second term.

It is losing campaigns and candidates who cry “stick to the issues”. Winning presidential campaigns capture the vibe by the political alchemy of personality, first, and policy, later. Like a first date, a voter must get “the feels” before they entertain the wonk of inflation reduction or stories about your awkward brother.

Urban’s “stick to the issues” steals a page from a long cast of liberal losers. In the Fifties, liberals noodled over the riddle of sustaining party loyalty in an era where old fidelities had faded. Southerners were no longer automatically voting Democrat. Northern white ethnics increasingly ignored political bosses. The liberal egghead answer was “programmatic liberalism”. In this equation, voters would decipher the meaning of issues to their own lives and vote accordingly. For the Democrats, voters were like Star Trek’s Spock or AI.

Since the Sixties, a bevy of well-intentioned liberals placed policy at the forefront of their campaigns. Nixon, Reagan, the Bushes, and Trump were the result. Liberals lose because they underestimate humanity’s frailties and foibles. Conservatives win because they don’t.

The latest political science affirms this reality. Voter behaviour is dictated by emotions just as much as rational choice. Even those of us with fancy degrees are influenced by “vibe” and “tribe” more than we admit. Obama’s healthcare-for-all and Iraq War posture mattered. But he, more than Sarah Palin or Chris Dodd, dressed, talked, and lived like your coolest professor from graduate school. Plus, Obama signalled a definitive vibe turn from the Clinton-Bush era. For upwardly mobile professionals, voting Obama was tribe and vibe first, policy came second.

### Midterms---No Link [Georgetown]---1AR

#### Biden proves they don’t care about actual concessions.

Chait ’9-3 [Jonathan; September 3; Staff Writer; The Atlantic; “The Wrong Way to Win Back the Working Class,” https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/09/democrats-unions-working-class/684085/]

In its period of exile, the Democratic Party has a lot of decisions to make. One of those decisions concerns its relationship with organized labor. Joe Biden and members of his administration—and, indeed, much of the party’s leadership—believed that forming a historically tight partnership with organized labor would help arrest the party’s decline with the working class. They turned out to be wrong. Working-class voters, even the small and shrinking share of them who belong to private-sector unions, continued drifting away, seemingly unimpressed by Union Joe’s long list of policy concessions.

Having seen their labor strategy collapse, Democrats are weighing two choices. One school of thought, favored on the progressive left, is that if Biden didn’t win back working-class voters, it’s because he wasn’t pro-union enough. For example, a recent newsletter by Dan Pfeiffer, a former Obama-administration official turned podcaster, argues that the path to winning back blue-collar voters requires (among other things) that Democrats “become even more pro-union.” Pfeiffer doesn’t explain why a more ardent alliance with organized labor would succeed for future Democratic candidates when it failed for Biden, or even how exceeding Biden on this score would be possible. The necessity and utility of the maneuver are simply taken as axiomatic.

A wiser strategy, one that a handful of Democrats have gingerly broached, would be to revert to the party’s traditional, pre-Biden stance toward labor. This approach would recognize that the political cost of trying to satisfy the labor movement’s every demand is rising, and the number of votes that the movement delivers in return for such fealty is shrinking. The experience of the Biden administration, and of some Democratic-run localities, suggests that automatic deference to unions can undermine what ought to be politicians’ top priority right now: lowering the cost of living. Which means it is making the goal of winning back working-class voters harder, not easier.

The Democrats have been the pro-labor party since the New Deal. But, before Biden, their alliance with labor was never unqualified. Democrats broadly supported laws that protected the right to organize, as well as the generous minimum-wage and social-insurance laws that unions favored. However, they made exceptions when they believed that union demands ran contrary to the public interest. Franklin D. Roosevelt himself sometimes intervened against striking unions, and even opposed public-sector unionization on principle. Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy had episodic fights with labor even as they usually took its side. Bill Clinton broke with labor to enact the North American Free Trade Agreement. Barack Obama offended teachers’ unions by supporting education reform, and defied some industrial unions by capping the tax break on expensive health-insurance plans.

Biden chose a different approach. He vowed to be “the most pro-union president leading the most pro-union administration in American history.” In practice, this meant not merely giving unions their customary seat at the table and vigorously enforcing labor law, as previous Democratic administrations had done, but exceeding that support in both symbolic and substantive ways. Biden called himself “a union man,” joined an auto-worker picket line and, with rare exceptions, gave labor nearly absolute deference on any issue in which it held a direct stake. His administration directed $36 billion in federal spending to bail out the Teamsters’ pension fund.

Yet even before he abandoned his reelection bid, Biden’s standing among working-class voters was dismal. Once Kamala Harris replaced him as the nominee, she failed to garner an endorsement from the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Longshoremen’s Association, or the United Mine Workers of America—or even the Teamsters. Harris won a majority of union households, but according to Pew data, these voters swung toward Donald Trump by six points compared with 2016, in terms of two-party vote share.

Why did the administration’s approach to unions fail to reap electoral rewards? One reason is that, as some union leaders have acknowledged, their members have begun basing their votes more on cultural issues, such as guns, immigration, and trans rights, than on economic ones. But there is another factor at play, one much less widely recognized: Uncritical fealty to union demands can cause Democrats to adopt policies that actually threaten working-class voters’ material well-being.

## Automation DA

### Automation DA---Top---1AR

#### Controlled studies confirm.

Dr. Benjamin Jensen 24, PhD, Professor of Strategic Studies at Marine Corps University; Brandon Valeriano, PhD, is a Assistant Professor at Seton Hall’s School of Diplomacy,; Sam Whitt, PhD is Associate Professor of Political Science at High Point, “How Cyber Operations can Reduce Escalation Pressures: Evidence from an Experimental Wargame Study,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 61(1), p. 119-120, 2024

Introduction

Despite over 30 years of documented cyber operations (Healey and Grindall, 2013), there is no consensus on how cyber operations affect crisis behavior during international disputes. In February 2019, India and Pakistan exchanged artillery and small arms fire while engaging in air-to-air combat and bombing runs after a terrorist attack which India blamed on Pakistan. Despite militarized escalation in this key rivalry alongside evidence of prior cyber exchanges (Valeriano and Maness, 2015), there were no observed large-scale cyber actions above the level of website defacements and temporarily taking websites offline (Times of India, 2019). Power plants did not shut down. Dams kept working.

Alternatively, in the summer of 2019, the United States opted for cyber attacks against Iran in lieu of strikes against its air and missile defenses after Tehran shot down a Global Hawk surveillance drone (Barnes and Gibbons-Neff, 2019). The target was the same: Iran’s air and missile defense, with lines of code seeking to disable computer systems replacing missiles striking radars while cruise missiles hit command posts, launchers, and storage deports (Bender and Lubold, 2019). Reports suggested the US President opted for the option after briefers assessed conventional strikes could kill over 150 Iranians, a number the President found disproportionate (Shear et al., 2019).

These events present a puzzle: When and why do states use cyber operations to respond during a dispute or crisis? Do cyber operations tend to be associated with more or less escalatory responses in crises? More broadly for the international relations community, how does any new disruptive technology alter the cycle of competitive risk-taking at the core of strategic exchange between rival states? Answering these questions is a core task for IR scholars and policymakers in the digital age. Scholars in this Special Issue of the Journal of Peace Research, speak to the new generation of cybersecurity scholarship that makes bold, theoretically grounded, and empirically tested claims about the dynamics of cyber conflict, particularly regarding human dimensions of cybersecurity (Shandler and Canetti, 2024).

This Special Issue focuses greater attention on the behavioral, psychological, cultural, and social dimensions of the people who engage in cybersecurity practices (Akoto, 2024; Kostyuk, 2024). Our research examines the behavioral dimensions of decision-making (Jardine et al., 2024). Understanding how decision-makers utilize and respond to cyber operations is crucial to preventing attacks from escalating into broader, more destructive crises (Lonergan and Lonergan, 2023). Of particular importance is whether decision-makers, even well-trained military advisers, have psychological predispositions or ingrained biases that might predispose them to escalatory behavior.

Experimental wargames offer a means to explore this puzzle.1 Any crisis is defined by interdependent decision-making in environments characterized by uncertainty, time pressure, and private information. New technologies and tools of coercion compound this uncertainty and create new risk vectors. Therefore, a viable research path is offered by designing exercises that replicate the context and character of national security decision-making environments, draw on players with similar backgrounds to career professionals, and utilize randomization and treatment groups that control for the impact of disruptive technologies.

To that end, we designed a strategic-level wargame that captures decisions about whether or not to escalate a crisis between two rival states. Our wargames were experimentally manipulated through random assignment of (1) a cyber triggering event to the crisis and (2) whether or not participants could respond with cyber operations alongside more traditional instruments of power (i.e. Diplomatic Information Military and Economic known as DIME). After observing 400 crisis responses via a cross-national wargame experiment, two insights emerge. First, the presence of cyber operations does not escalate militarized disputes. In experimental settings, participants did not use cyber operations to escalate a hypothetical crisis with a rival state. Second, the presence of cyber responses in a crisis increases the range of options and provides additional bargaining space. As a result, cyber options provide a means to shape the crisis while creating possible off-ramps and alternatives to the use of military force or other coercive means (Jensen and Valeriano, 2022).

#### Non-escalation is the whole point.

Tom Uren 25, Senior Analyst in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Cyber Policy Centre, Cybersecurity Reporter for Lawfare, “Why Iran Is a Scaredy Cat Cyber Chicken,” Lawfare, 7/4/25, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-iran-is-a-scaredy-cat-cyber-chicken

That ability to cause adversaries some pain without triggering a military response is part of the appeal of cyber operations. A Google report examining Iranian cyber operations against Israel described them as "tools of first resort" because they provide:

a lower-cost, lower-risk way for rivals to engage in conflict, gather information, disrupt daily life, and shape public perceptions — all while still remaining below the line of direct confrontation.

### Automation DA---U---1AR

#### Err AFF their evidence is based on a single study done at a bakery???

Thompson et al. 24 <Kentucky Blue> – Director of the FutureTech Project, MIT. Ph.D., Business & Public Policy, UC-Berkeley. M.A., Economics, London School of Economics. Neil Thompson, Maja S. Svanberg, M.S. of Technology & Policy at MIT, Wensu Li, Ph.D. candidate in Economics at UConn, Martin Fleming, Research Scientist at MIT Sloan, Brian C. Goehring, A.B. in Cognitive Studies and Philosophy from Princeton, 02-08-2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4700751

A simple hypothetical example makes clear why these considerations are so important. Consider a small bakery evaluating whether to automate with computer vision. One task that bakers do is to visually check their ingredients to ensure they are of sufficient quality (e.g. unspoiled). This task could theoretically be replaced with a computer vision system by adding a camera and training the system to detect food that has gone bad. Even if this visual inspection task could be separated from other parts of the production process, would it be cost effective to do so? Bureau of Labor Statistics O\*NET data imply that checking food quality comprises roughly 6% of the duties of a baker. A small bakery with five bakers making typical salaries ($48,000 each per year), thus has potential labor savings from automating this task of $14,000 per year. This amount is far less than the cost of developing, deploying and maintaining a computer vision system and so we would conclude that it is not economical to substitute human labor with an AI system at this bakery.

#### And they have conveniently highlighted it---neg evidence doesn’t say AI adoption gradual, but rather the effects on labor is

Thompson et al. 24 <Kentucky Blue> – Director of the FutureTech Project, MIT. Ph.D., Business & Public Policy, UC-Berkeley. M.A., Economics, London School of Economics. Neil Thompson, Maja S. Svanberg, M.S. of Technology & Policy at MIT, Wensu Li, Ph.D. candidate in Economics at UConn, Martin Fleming, Research Scientist at MIT Sloan, Brian C. Goehring, A.B. in Cognitive Studies and Philosophy from Princeton, 02-08-2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4700751

The conclusion from this example, that human workers are more economically-attractive for firms (particularly those without scale), turns out to be widespread. We find that only 23% of worker compensation “exposed” to AI computer vision would be cost-effective for firms to automate because of the large upfront costs of AI systems. The economics of AI can be made more attractive, either through decreases in the cost of deployments or by increasing the scale at which deployments are made, for example by rolling-out AI-as-a-service platforms (Borge 2022), which we also explore. Overall, our model shows that the job loss from AI computer vision, even just within the set of vision tasks, will be smaller than the existing job churn seen in the market, suggesting that labor replacement will be more gradual than abrupt.

#### Companies are rapidly expanding automation, now, but It creates jobs ensuring backlash is minimal.

Mark Talmage-Rostron 25 Content Manager Europe at SolarEdge Technologies. “How will Artificial Intelligence will Change the World,” Nexford University, 6-29-2025, https://www.nexford.edu/insights/how-will-ai-affect-jobs, doa: 9-7-25, lmc

Artificial intelligence (AI) could replace the equivalent of 300 million full-time jobs, a report by investment bank Goldman Sachs says. It could replace a quarter of work tasks in the US and Europe but may also mean new jobs and a productivity boom.

And it could eventually increase the total annual value of goods and services produced globally by 7%. The report also predicts two-thirds of jobs in the U.S. and Europe “are exposed to some degree of AI automation,” and around a quarter of all jobs could be performed by AI entirely.

Researchers from the University of Pennsylvania and OpenAI found some educated white-collar workers earning up to $80,000 a year are the most likely to be affected by workforce automation.

Forbes also says that According to an MIT and Boston University report, AI will replace as many as two million manufacturing workers by 2025.

A study by the McKinsey Global Institute reports that by 2030, at least 14% of employees globally could need to change their careers due to digitization, robotics, and AI advancements

### Automation DA---No Link---1AR

### Automation DA---U---AI Bubble---1AR

#### Collapse is imminent---all indicators prove

Paul L. 9-24-25, Staff writer at Finbold, “Analyst reveals when the stock market will burst as ‘AI bubble’ phase begins”, September 24th, 2025, <https://finbold.com/analyst-reveals-when-the-stock-market-will-burst-as-ai-bubble-phase-begins/>, DOA: 9/24/25, Rslish

As the benchmark S&P 500 trades at record highs, an analyst has observed that a review of technical indicators from a historical perspective suggests the market is now entering an artificial intelligence-driven bubble.

Notably, the AI sector has been leading the stock market in recent years, with analysts warning about the sustainability of the rally and frequently drawing comparisons to the Dot-com bubble of 2000.

This momentum is highlighted by the index now targeting the 7,000 zone, after closing the last session at 6,656.

On the technical front, analysis by TradingShot in a TradingView post on September 23 indicated that the index is currently trading within a century-long Fibonacci Channel that has historically captured both bull and bear market cycles.

The outlook suggested that since the November 2022 bottom, equities have surged into a strong bull phase powered by artificial intelligence optimism.

At present, the benchmark index is pressing against the upper boundary of the 0.5–0.618 Fibonacci zone, a level last reached during the Dot-com run-up of the late 1990s.

Additionally, the market briefly entered the higher 0.618–0.786 “ghost zone” before collapsing in early 2001, sparking one of the sharpest corrections in modern history. If history repeats, a similar pattern could unfold between late 2025 and early 2026, with the S&P 500 testing this long-untouched resistance zone.

Next S&P 500 buying opportunity

Consequently, TradingShot suggested that a correction back toward the monthly 50-moving average (MA) would mark the next significant buying opportunity, potentially setting the stage for further gains as the AI-driven rally extends deeper into the decade.

The model projects that while the AI bubble could propel markets to record highs, its eventual bursting is most likely to occur between 2030 and 2032, echoing the structural patterns that defined the internet bubble.

However, some analysts argue that the chances of a collapse comparable to the Dot-com era are minimal. They point out that, unlike the internet boom, today’s AI rally is underpinned by tangible business applications, which could drive the index above 7,000 as early as 2026.

#### It’s not just the bubble but the over hyped investment trends

Paulo Carvão 25, Senior Fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, “Is The AI Bubble Bursting? Lessons From The Dot-Com Era”, August 22nd, 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulocarvao/2025/08/21/is-the-ai-bubble-bursting-lessons-from-the-dot-com-era/, DOA: 9/24/25, Rslish

One should pause when even OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, who helped spark the AI boom, warns that the market may be overheating. He and other investors mention soaring valuations, too much money chasing unproven business models and the risk of building infrastructure faster than demand will justify. Like in the MIT report, they worry that much of the capital outlays are flowing into projects unlikely to deliver results soon. The concern is less about AI’s long-term promise and more about inflated expectations setting the stage for a sharp correction.

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